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NOTES
THE DOCTRINE OF ENTRAPMENT
Entrapment has been defined as the inducement of one to
commit a crime not contemplated by him, for the sole purpose of
instituting criminal prosecution against him.' In general, the de-
fense of entrapment appears to be the outgrowth of American
judicial decisions rather than the result of constitutional or statutory
provision. 2 The defense of entrapment ought to be distinguished
from cases involving consent,4 in which it is questioned whether
or not the crime has in fact been committed. Entrapment is avail-
able as a defense when all the requisite elements of a crime have
been proved.
Norden's Case5 appears to have been the first case in which the
defense was even remotely considered. United States v. Whittier,6
decided in 1878, was the first case in the Federal courts in which
the defense of entrapment was considered, but the court ignored
the defense basing its decision on other matter. Following the
case, the defense was raised and considered in subsequent cases,
but in none of them was the defendant acquitted on the basis of the
defense as the courts considered the defense inapplicable to the
facts.- In Woo Wai v. United States," decided in 1915 it was for
the first time established that a defendant who had committed
1. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932); State v. Marquardt, 139 Conn. 1,
89 A.2d 219 (1952). See Swallum v. United States, 39 F.2d 390 (8th Cir. 1930);
Morei v. United States, 127 F.2d 827 (6th Cir. 1942); United States v. Wray, 8 F.2d 429
(N.D. Ga. 1925).
2. See United States v. Washington, 20 F.2d 160 (D.C. Neb. 1927) (Entrapment is
not a common law doctrine.).
3. United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1933); United States v. Washington,
20 F.2d 160 (D.C. Neb. 1927) (The defense is a creation of judicial indignation at the
inciting of law enforcement officials of our innocent citizens into criminal conduct.).
4. People v. Mills, 178 N.Y. 274, 70 N.E. 786 (1904) (An example of a case in
which the problems of consent and entrapment were confused); Carnes v. State, 134 Tex.
Crim. 8, 113 S.W.2d 542 (1938) (In the crimes of robbery, theft, burglary and others,
lack of consent is an essential element-there is no crime if there be a plan by the one
whose property is involved); People v. Werner, 16 Cal. 2d 216, 105 P.2d 927 (1940) (On
the distinction between consent and entrapment). No case has been found in which the
defense of entrapment has been recognized against a charge of murder, rape. or a similar
offense.
5. 2 East P.C. 666 (In that early case, one, knowing that a highway robber frequented
a certain place, intentionally went there, and being attacked by the robber surrendered
his money, and then overcame the robber and later prosecuted him. Held, robbery since
the act was not procured by the prosecutor, but was the voluntary act of the robber.).
6. 28 Fed. Case 591, No. 16,688 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1878).
7. United States v. Grimm, 156 U.S. 604 (1895) (In this case, a government inspector,
on a tip that the defendant was engaged in dealing with obscene pictures, sent to the
defendant what he termed a trial order for some "fancy photographs". The order was sent
after defendant's response, to an original inquiry, stating that he could supply such
pictures. On these facts, the defendant was convicted under a statute making it unlawful
to give information by mail, where, how, or by whom such pictures could be obtained.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction); Price v. United States, 165 U.S. 311 (1897).
8. 223 Fed. 412 (9th Cir. 1915).
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the crime for which he was indicted was entitled to an acquittal
on the ground of entrapment. This case appeared to clarify an
earlier case9 in which, although it was recognized that the accused
might successfully -plead entrapment, a confusing generalization
had been made to the effect that the defense of entrapment would
not be available unless the government made the guilty act ap-
pear innocent.
Finally, in 1932, in Sorrells v. United States,' the United States
Supreme Court was confronted with a case that could have been
the panacea to lift the doctrine from the depths of confusion. In
this case, a prohibition agent gained defendant's confidence and
after several requests for liquor the defendant complied. At "the
trial, defendant introduced evidence of his good character which
was refuted by the government's evidence that he had the reputa-
tion of being a rum-runner." Defendant relied on the defense of
entrapment. The lower court refused to sustain the defense, denying
a motion to direct a verdict in favor of -defendant; and it also
refused to submit the issue of entrapment to the jury, ruling hat
as a matter of law there was no entrapment. 1 The Supreme Cout
reversed the conviction on the ground that Congress did not in-
tend the prohibition statute to apply where an officer instigated
sale of liquor rather than the defendant.',
The law itself as established in the Sorrells case, and for the most
part followed since that time, appears to offer credence for the
following general principles: (1) Entrapment is a doctrine of
substantive law-the act creating a crime will be construed by
reading into it a condition or proviso that if the offender shall have
been entrapped into the crime the law shall not apply to him,
thus effectuating the intent of the legislature.14 (2) The test of
entrapment is to look to the origin of the criminal intent to see
if it is with the officer and was implanted in the mind of the
otherwise innocent person; if so there is entrapment.'" (8) Entrap-
ment is a question of fact for the jury.'6 (4) The defense comes
9. United States v. Healy, 202 Fed. 349 (D.C. Mont. 1913) (Government agents
instructed an Indian to deal with defendant, who had been suspected of selling liquor "s
Indians. The only difficulty was that the Indian selected could not be distinguished from a
white man. The court, quite logically, held that the accused might successfully plead
entrapment since he had been deceived into believing that his acts did not violate the law.
But, the court went beyond this statement and announced the generalization above.
10. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
11. The matter of defendant's history is of some importance and will be treated subse-
quently.
12. See note 10 supra at 438.
13. Id. at 448.
14. Ibid.
15. Id. at 451.
16. Id. at 452.
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in under a plea of not guilty and need not be pleaded in bar.1 7
Mr. Justice Roberts concurred in the decision, but contended
that to read into the statute a condition that the statute was not
to be applied to an entrapped defendant necessitated a strained
construction, the addition of an element not contained in the
legislation-judicial amendment.8 He argued that entrapment is
contrary to public policy. Also in his opinion, the test of entrapment
would be based only upon the officer's conduct, disregarding the
conduct of the accused. In this test guilt would be assumed by
the court as a prerequisite to the defense; the defendant's future
would then rest in a determination by the court of the officer's
conduct. Lastly, it was contended that entrapment is a question
of law for the court in that allowing jury determination of the
issue results in the trial of a false issue-guilt to prior convictions-
wholly outside the scope of the question at hand, which is the
defendant's guilt in the particular fact situation.
The decision in the Sorrells case appears to deny the very exis-
tence of the defense of entrapment, for, in essence, they sa that
the defendant has committed no offense because the statute is read
as though it contained a condition to the effect that its provisions
are not violated by an act induced by an officer. Thus, if there
is no offense, there need be no defense to the charge. This reason-
ing appears to the writer to be faulty for the nature of the defense
of entrapment is such that it presupposes the existence of the
crime and its every necessary element. It appears unwarranted
to contend that one who has admittedly gone through every neces-
sary mental and physical act to commit a crime is yet guilty of no
offense and to reach this conclusion by reading into every appli-
cable criminal statute a provision that it should not apply if the
act complained of has been induced by an officer.
During 1958 two United States Supreme Court cases, Sherman v.
United States and Masciale v. United States, added significance
.to the doctrine, if not especial new enlightenment or original ap-
proach.19
In the Sherman case a government informer made numerous en-
treaties for narcotics to relieve his alleged suffering; the defendant
secured drugs for him. The Court was unanimous in its view that
17. Ibid.
18. Id. at 456.
19.. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Masciale v. United States,
356 U.S. 386 (1958). Both cases deal with narcotics violations, which along with liquor




the government's own evidence that the defendant obtained nar-
cotics for the informer only after repeated persuasion, including
an appeal to sympathy and the inducement of the defendant to
return to the narcotics habit, established the defense of entrapment
as a matter of law.
In the second of the two decisions, the Masciale case, the de-
fendant was charged with the sale of narcotics and conspiracy to
make such sale. The defendant was introduced to a government
agent by an informer after which the defendant introduced the
agent to the party who sold the drugs. The defendant denied he
had any available source of narcotics, and stated that he contacted
the seller only upon the inducement of the government agent. The
trial court sent the issue of entrapment to the jury and the petitioner
was convicted. The High Court affirmed the conviction, holding
that the defense could be established as a matter of law only
from the undisputed testimony of the prosecution's witnesses and
not from the sole testimony of the defendant, though that testimony
was undisputed. The court held that while the defendant presented
enough evidence for the jury to find for him, they were not com-
pelled to do so.
Both the Sherman and Masciale decisions involved, to a limited
extent, a restatement and affirmation of the decision in Sorrells.
However, in both cases, four judges joined in minority opinions,
which restated the concurring opinion in Sorrells. In the Sherman
case, a separate concurring opinion took the position that the Sor-
rells case represents an impractical approach because to speak of
the "creative activity" (origination of criminal intent or setting
in motion criminal activity) of law enforcement officials is nebulous,
and because the doctrine of the Sorrells case causes the court to
shirk its responsibility to meet the danger of over-zealous law
enforcement. The concurring opinion in the Sherman case contend-
ed, as did the Sorrells concurring opinion, that the question is
whether the court can countenance the methods employed by
government officials in order to prosecute.
The concurring opinion in the Sherman case states a need for
clarification of the entrapment doctrine and yet would continue
to work it out on a case by case method with little guidance. The
concurring opinion does suggest that the defendant's character,
and predisposition are not in issue and this suggestion appears
inestimably meritorious. It would eliminate the highly prejudicial
and questionable prosecution tactic of introducing the defendant's
1959]
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past criminal record to show a willingness to commit the particular
offense with which he is charged. A defendant's criminal record
should not be weighed against the deplorable police tactics in
such cases, for the defendant has but little opportunity to come
out of the measurement in any condition other than wanting, es-
pecially in front of a jury. However, to avoid such a circumstance
seems difficult once the defendant takes the stand, for past con-
victions then become a basis of impeachment.20
The dissenters in the Masciale case argued that the case should
have been remanded to the district court so that the trial judge
could rule on the adequacy of the defense as a matter of law,2
1
which is in accord with the minority opinions in the Sorrells, Sher-
man and Masciale cases.
In accord with the decisions in the three above mentioned cases,
it is the general rule that if there is evidence that the crime was
committed at the institution or inducement of government agents,
that the criminal intent originated with them, and that the defend-
ant would not have committed the offense but for the conduct of
the government agents, the availability of the defense is a question
of fact for the jury.2- In fact, since Sorrells, the Courts of Appeals,
have unanimously concluded that the issue whether a defendant
has been entrapped is for the jury unless, of course, the situation
is one in regard to which reasonable men could not differ..23
For instance, if entrapment becomes evident from the prosecution's
own evidence, it should be dealt with by the court without regard
to the stage of proceedings. 2 The entrapment defense may also
be raised by a motion at the close of the evidence for a directed
verdict of not guilty.2s It may also be upheld, as a matter of law,
20. But, the Uniform Rules of Evidence provide that if the accused does not offer
evidence supporting his own credibility the prosecution shall not be allowed, on cross-
examination or otherwise, to prove for impeachment purposes, his commission or conviction
of crime. Uniform Rules of Evidence, R. 21.
21. The dissenting opinion admitted, however, that on a mere reading of the record
the evidence for sustaining the defense appeared rather "thin", but that the trial judge,
who had heard and seen the witnesses might attach different weight to the evidence than
the record revealed.
22. See, e.g., Jarl v. United States, 19 F.2d 891 (8th Cir. 1927); Driskell v. United States,
24 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1928); Hunter v. United States, 62 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1932);
Ryles v. United States, 183 F.2d 944 (10th Cir. 1950); Demos v. United States, 205
F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1953); Kivette v. United States, 230 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1956).
23. Louie Hung v. United States, 111 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1940); United States v.
Lindenfeld, 142 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1944); United States v. Brandenburg, 162 F.2d 980
(3d Cir. 1947); Nero v. United States, 189 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1951). In the :ollowing
cases the courts have reversed convictions where the issue of entrapment was not submitted
to the. jury: Wall v. United States, 65 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1933); Lofty v. United States,
198 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1952); United States v. Sawyer, 210 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1954).
24. See note 10 supra at 438.
25. See, e.g., St. Clair v. United States, 17 F.2d 886 (8th Cir. 1927).
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after verdict.2 6 A writ of habeas corpus may entitle the prisoner
to be discharged.
27
As a general principle, applicable regardless of which approach
is taken-Sorrells decision or concurring opinion-if the criminal
intent originates in the mind of the accused and the offense is com-
pleted, the fact that government officers merely afforded oppor-
tunities or facilities for the commission of the offense will not
defeat the prosecution.2 1 The gist of entrapment consists of active
persuasion on the part of an officer to induce one to commit a
crime.2 9 If the officer uses inducements that would overcome the
reluctance of an innocent citizen, such as pleas of suffering,"° or
offers of great sums of money,2 ' entrapment is usually in issue
and upheld. It is submitted that such inducements should not be
countenanced by the court even if the defendant has a record of
violations.
Artifice and stratagem may be employed to catch those engaged
in criminal offenses.2 In other words, where there is nothing more
than a simple request to make an unlawful sale of liquor or
narcotics or to engage in some other type of vice, the defense of
entrapment is not available.'
Another question which arises in connection with the doctrine
is whether or not the accused's continued course of criminal activi-
ty, if any, could be used by the prosecution to show
propensity to commit the crime. Evidently, according to the law
of the Sorrells and Sherman cases, such a showing is permissible.
Whether a showing by the prosecution of a continuing course of
criminal conduct to establish reasonable suspicion would be limited
to prior convictions is a somewhat moot point, although it would
26. United States v. Healy, 202 Fed. 349 (D.C. Mont. 1913) (A judgment and
sentence were set aside and the defendant discharged upon the court's ascertaining that
the conviction was procured by entrapment).
27. United States ex rel. Hassel v. Mathues, 22 F.2d 979 (E.D. Pa. 1927).
28. Bloch v. United States, 226 F.2d 185, 188 (9th Cir. 1955) ("The defense of
entrapment is not available to one standing ready to commit an offense given an oppor-
tunity."); Kivette v. United States, 230 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1956) (The mere fact that
officer's disguise afforded defendant an opportunity to commit a crime which he was ready
and willing to accept doss not constitute entrapment). See Flynn v. United States, 57
F.2d 1044 (8th Cir. 1932); United Stat-s v. Hughey, 212 F.2d 896 (8th Cir. 1954).
29. Swallum v. United States, 39 F.2d 390 (8th Cir. 1930).
30. Wall v. United States, 65 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1933).
31. Upited States v. Wray, 8 F.2d 429 (N.D. Ga. 1925) (dictum).
32. GHmm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604 (1895); Andrews v. United States, 162
U.S. 420 (1896); Price v. United States, 165 U.S. 311 (1897); United States v.
Reisenweber, 288 Fed. 520 (2d' Cir. 1923).
33. Jordan v. United States, 2 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1924) (Offer to purchase liquor by
"government witnesses"); Kendjerski v. United States, 9 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1926). See
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1927) (Mere use by the government
of traps and decoys does not render an indictment based upon such 'evidence a nullity nor
does it call for the exclusion of evidence thus procured).
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appear that such a showing would not be so limited. A further
question which does not appear to have been discussed would
be whether there must be a similarity between the continuing
course of conduct and the crime charged. By a parity of reasoning,
it is possible that such a similarity would be required.
In Certain Quantities of Intoxicating Liquors34 it was held that
two conditions must be present to warrant a conviction when the
issue is entrapment: the officers must have suspicion that the party
is engaged in criminal activity, and the original plan and initiation
must come from the defendant. The requirement that there must
be reasonable suspicion has been asserted in many cases.3 1 Often
reasonable suspicion means little more than the fact that the
suspect has a criminal record.
There appear to be several well defined limitations to the usage
of the doctrine. If the accused was provoked to commit an offense
by a private person not working in conjunction with the govern-
ment, the defense is not available. The defense is limited to sit-
uations where the offense was instigated by the police." The
doctrine is a personal defense and is not available to a defendant
if his partner was entrapped .3  In a Federal prosecution it is no
bar to the defense that the entrapment was done by a state offi-
cer.
3 s
North Dakota apparently has considered the defense of entrap-
ment but once.3 9 In that case a detective, in order to obtain evi-
dence, accompanied the accused in the burglary of a store. The
detective simply acquiesced in the defendant's plan and made no
suggestions. The defendant himself removed marked bills from the
store. In defense, the accused raised the following two contentions:
the alleged consent to burglary of his store by the store owner
and the detective's participation. The court denied both of the
defenses and found him guilty. Obviously, the case also involved
a question of consent, but the result as to entrapment appears
sound.
Entrapment as a defense to criminal prosecution is comparatively
34. 290 Fed. 824 (D.C. N.H. 1921).
35. See, e.g., Heath v. United States, 169 F.2d 1007, 1010 (10th Cir. 1948) ("It fs
well recognized that officers may entrap one into the commission of an offense only when
they have reasonable grounds to believe that he is engaged in unlawful activities. They
may not initiate the intent and purpose of the violation. In ,a case of entrapment, it .s
incumbent on the government to prove reasonable grounds to believe that the intent and
purpose to violate the law existed in the mind of the accused.").
36. See, e.g., Polski v. United States, 33 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1929); Henderson v.
United States, 237 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1956).
37. United States v. Perkins, 190 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1951).
38. Henderson v. United States, 237 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1956).
39. State v. Currie, 13 N.D. 655, 102 N.W. 875 (1905).
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NOTES
prevalent in our day. However, the decisions reveal that definite
guidance for the application of the doctrine is sadly wanting.
The courts are generally in agreement on the importance that the
origination of criminal intent is with the defendant, but there is
little certainty as to whether the criminal record of the accused
can be used in determining reasonable cause.
Extreme positions have been taken in regard to the defense.
Tennessee has rejected the defense completely.40 Colorado has
held that authorities who entrap suspected violators can be con-
victed of conspiracy.
41
It appears to the writer that the most realistic approach is that of
Mr. Justice Roberts, as espoused in the concurring opinion of
Sorrells. Acceptance of this view, which is not law today, would
limit consideration of conduct solely to that of the police and thus
give impetus to what the writer feels, is the true meaning of en-
trapment; it would allow court determination of the issue as a
question of law, and Would not depend upon a defendant's record
for conviction on a particular charge. Travel on the road to cer-
tainty must be made in the field and this view would provide at
least a suitable road map.
WILLIAM A. STRTZ
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NORTH DAKOTA'S
FEDERALIZED STATE INCOME TAX
INTRODUCTION
"Federalization" of state income tax law means that the pro-
visions of the state law are made to conform, to a greater or lesser
degree, to the provisions of the federal Internal Revenue Code
of 1954.' The need for this conformity is but one facet of the
40. Thomas v. State, 182 Tenn. 380, 187 S.W.2d 529 (1945); Goins v. State, 192
Tenn. 32, 237 S.W.2d 8 (1951).
41. Reigan v. People, 120 Colo. 472, 210 P.2d 991 (1949).
1. Generally, see Brabner-Smith, Incorporation by Reference and Delegation of Power-
Validity of "Reference" Legislation, 5 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 198 (1937); Kanter, A Critique
of Some Federal, State, and Local Tax Coordination Techniques, 29 Ind. L.J. 28 (1953);
King, State Constitutions Forbidding Incorporation by Reference, 16 B.U.L. Rev. 625 (1936);
Lockyer, Kentucky Income Tax Compared With Federal Income Tax, 42 Ky. L.J. 368
(1954); Lockyer, History of the Kentucky Income Tax, 43 Ky. L.J. 457 (1955); Mermin,
"Cooperative Federalism" Again: State and Municipal Legislation Penalizing Violation of
Existing and Future Federal Requirements: I, 57 Yale L.J. 1, 19 (1947); J. Miller, The
New Iowa Income Tax Law, 41 Iowa L. Rev. 85 (1955); P. Miller, Proposal for a Feder-
ally-Based New York Personal Income Tax, 13 Tax L. Rev. 183 (1958); Read, Is Refer-
ential Legislation Worth While?, 25 Minn. L. Rev. 261 (1941); Notes, 3 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 482 (1935), 17 Montana L. Rev. 203 (1956); Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d 797 (1955);
Annot., 166 A.L.R. 516 (1947); Address by Kenneth M. Jakes, Spec. Assistant Attorney
Gen. for the N. Dak. State Tax Comm'r's Office, 1958 convention of the N. Dak. Soc'y
of CPA's, October 4, 1958.
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